WWI M1911 Spec 1125 Summer Service Coat; CPT Co. A 345th Bn, US Tank Corps 1918

Description

WWI M1911 Spec 1125 Officers Summer Service Coat; Co. "A", 345th
Battalion, U.S. Tank Corps
For your consideration is this WWI U.S. Army Model 1911 Officers Summer Tunic.
This tunic was used by an Officer of the 345th Tank Battalion.
This tunic is identified to Ranulf Compton.
This tunic is when he was a Captain in the U.S. Army dating this tunic to 1918. It has a Mexican Border Service ribbon and a Silver Sharp Shooter badge. (His Mexican Border Service medal was numbered #19703. His name is inscribed 2x within the tunic.
During 1918, Captain Ranulf Compton commanded "A" Co., 345th Battalion, U.S. Tank Corps.
This grouping includes:
• M1911 Officers Summer Service Coat, Spec 1126.
• M1921 Officers Service Belt, Sam Browne: Manufactured by Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot 1921.
• M1902 Sword Hanger
• Silver Sharpshooter badge
• Mexican Border Service Ribbon
• Army Whistle
• Type II Tank Corps Officers Collar Devices
• U.S. Collar Device
• Silver Faux Embroidered Captains bars.
• Army Map
1911 Service Coat
Specification No. 1125, adopted on August 15, 1911
In
order to reduce the manufacturing cost of the soldier’s olive drab woolen service dress, the Quartermaster Department adopted an entirely new style of service coat in 1911.
Like the 1909 Service coat before it, the simplified 1911 Service Coat was:
Made from 13 ounce to the yard olive drab worsted serge woolen material.
Lined with light weight, olive drab luster wool serge fabric.
Sewn with olive drab silk thread.
Although the 1911 coat used the same style of contract label, the label was moved to the inside of the lower right hand pocket. It was also stipulated that the garment’s specification number be added to the label. However, that particular requirement of the new specifications seemed to have been laxly enforced as numerous post 1911 contract labels do not bear the specification number.
The 1911 Service Coat’s external appearance differed radically from the Army’s earlier service coat designs:
The “standing rolling” collar found on the 1909 Service Coat, which had been pierced for two collar discs on each side, was replaced by a “standing” collar that now only required one grommet hole per side to accommodate the single collar disc that had now been prescribed for wear, one on each side.
The “choke bellows” style of pocket was replaced by flat, rectangular shaped patch pockets.
The pointed cuffs were replaced by plain cuffs that feature two rows of stitching placed approximately three inches from the bottom edge of each sleeve.
AMERICAN ARMOR DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
At the beginning of America’s involvement in WWI Captain Patton found himself in General Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces headquarters as a staff officer assigned to make sure the offices and staff needs were well manned with paper, ink, desks, cars and that they were maintained in a highly efficient manor. In plan terms he was an office clerk.  Here are a couple examples of what his staff duties entailed.
These papers, some in French are hardly the things that Captain Patton thought a combat trained West Point graduate would find any upward mobility or promotion any time in the offing.
There was much talk in headquarters about the new battle implement called a tank. Little was known about these armored tracked vehicles except they brought fear to the enemy and had some protection to the troops manning them. America had not one. Pershing had established a board of high ranking staff officers to gather information and they had concluded that they should proceed and pursue the use of them.  The “tank board” concluded that the tank was destined to become an important element of war. General Pershing assigned Lt. Col. Leroy Eltinge to assemble all the information on the soon to be formed tank service.  They would be looking into both heavy and light tanks and envisioned the manufacture and purchase of some 600 heavy tanks (British) and some 1200 light tanks (French). They wanted them to be built in the United States and shipped over.   All of this was on paper and no real field knowledge was available on just how this could take place.
Captain Patton saw a chance to get involved in them from the ground floor but had some real fears. Should he get the assignment and fail his career would be over, at least in his mind.
The US Army’s first tank soldier
Capt. George S. Patton, Jr. was officially assigned to develop a tank program in the US Army on November 10, 1917.  This assignment made him the very first and for a little while the only tank soldier. His assignment was to study the French and British tank schools, examine the use of light tanks and come up with a plan of action to bring light tanks into the US Army as a fighting force.  Shortly thereafter a young first lieutenant, assigned to the artillery branch, was transferred was assigned to help him.  His name was Lt. Elgin Braine of Battery D. 6th Field Artillery. Neither of them knew anything about tanks and together they were ordered to the French Light Tank Training Center at Chamlieu near Paris, France. They visited the battlefields and studied both the French and British approaches to the use of these brand new weapons of war.  After a little over a month of intense study, Captain Patton submitted a highly detailed 58 page double spaced report with several attachments and recommendations to Pershing’s staff, eventually to be read by Pershing himself.  The report was extremely concise and went into every aspect of what it would take for the US Army to build a light tank corps capable of fighting on the battlefields in France, was covered. The report outlined the establishing of a tank school, use and maintenance of the Renault FT 17 tank and even the numbers of nuts bolts and tools needed to be on hand to keep them running in combat. His report, with input from Lt. Braine, was so comprehensive that it was accepted without revision and Capt Patton was ordered to make it happen.
All of Rockenbach’s tasks required tact and push. And Rockenbach, with Patton's loyal support, despite an occasional reservation expressed privately, would make a go of his job
Lt. Baine was sent to the states to secure the manufacturing of the Renaults tanks in the United States. To make this long story short, he ran into the American bureaucracy inside and out side the government. It was too slow and no tanks were built and sent over to France but two, and both arrived after the war’s end in 1919. He worked tirelessly and came back to France, had materials and a tank sent back to the states and did all he could.
Training in French Renault FT 17 light tanks
Determined, Patton now a Major, used what he had, trained the soldiers he was given and made them ready for combat, awaiting the tanks promised to be made in the states.
Patton secured a firing range in a ravine and wooden sleds were used to teach gunner and simulate the movement tanks as they fired at fixed targets. They constructed wooden boxes on skids and mounted French Hotchkiss Machine guns in them and later the 37 mm tank cannon in them to practice target shooting and become familiar with the weapons in the Renault tanks.
Getting the land from the French and tanks to train on was slow going and Patton went to Paris to try and speed the process up. January and February passed slowly.
After the land was obtained for the school and two months went by they received their first tanks. On the 23rd of March, 10 French Renault FT 17’s light tanks arrived by rail to be unloaded at the tank school. They arrived with no weapons or turret fore plates to attach them. The newly promoted Lt. Col Patton had to drive them off and teach the others quickly to do so as there were no tanks prior to this to practice with. Several responded and together the tanks were driven, in the dark, to the tank training center. By midnight they were safely at the training center in Bourg, which was over a mile from the rail line. The new tanks were run 10 hours a day and training was constant as the men alternated in and out of the 10 tanks.
The training center would change to the 301 TC and the whole of the light tanks would eventually end up as the 304th…till Washington changed the numbers again. The 301 number would soon be the heavy tank brigade, not to be confused with the 301 TC. ] What remained constant was the triangular tank patch which separated the men in Patton’s 1st Tank Brigade from the heavy tank brigades.
While the light tank brigade were being developed in France the 301st Heavy Tank Battalion was to be raised at Camp Meade, Maryland and the personnel transported to the British Tank Schools at Camp Bovington in southern England, for training. There were no tanks on US soil to train on. Are you confused now? Most are. So for the rest of this article Patton’s 1st Light Tank Brigade will be a little bit more clear as to numbers… but not much.
Training at the tank center took place all summer and Lt.Col. Patton also attended and taught schools for AEF staff officers.
By August 16, 1918 there were 900 men and 50 fully trained officers at the tank center and but they still had only 25 tanks.
The 1st  Light tank Brigade went about constructing a field machine shop at the tank school to keep up with the maintenance of the tanks. In Patton’s original report he had envisioned the tanks to have a more mobile approach to maintenance.
Finally on September 1st the promised French Renault light tanks began to arrive by rail. Nowhere near the numbers promised and it became apparent that Patton would have to make due with only 144 light tanks. They were to be divided into two battalions. Had it not been for the constant training of his command with the few tanks he had, manning brand new tanks it would have been impossible to have taken them from the rail head into battle.  The logistics of immediately manning these tanks was equally enormous as they had to be provided with 20,000 gallons of gas, 2,000 gallons of light oil and 600 gallons of grease, all of which had to be applied in order for the tanks to be brought into battle ready conditions. This does not include the ammunition needed and the logistics behind their moving them to the embarkation area in time to be used as planned.
On September 12, 1918, Lt. Col Patton tanks entered the St. Mihiel Offensive and they would be joined by two French tank Battalion bringing the total number of tanks committed by French and the US to 419 tanks. Of these were 24 were French Schneiders.  Patton’s 1st Tank Brigade consisted of 144 light French Renault FT 17 tanks and 24 Schneiders French heavy tanks in Chanoines’ IV Groupement. The 1st Tank Battalion was given the mission of supporting the US 1st Infantry division and the US 42nd infantry division.  During one portion of the battle Patton rode the back deck of one of his tanks as his visibility was crucial to direct the tanks. The tank received german machine gun fire and was hit on the front of the turret and the sides causing Patton to quickly dismount into a nearby shell hole. The portion of the offensive lasted from the 12th through the 16th of September 1918.
The tanks, including the French detachment of light and heavy tanks moved into their final positions on the night of September 11th.  It was raining which would add to the problems off getting the tanks in battle position.
Patton had issued his orders to his subordinates and they communicated it to the tankers.
By 1 am on the 12th of September all of the tanks were in position with the exception of Captain Compton’s company C, which had trouble getting the French train operators to drop them where they could disembark.  They had to remove the tanks in driving rain, move them several miles and were in place by 5 am the morning of the battle.
The mud was knee deep in placeless the morning of the battle severally hampering the function of the tanks causing them to use far more gasoline than was originally thought to be needed.
A four hour artillery barrage was undertaken and the tanks then received orders to move out toward their prospective objectives.  The 326th Battalion tanks lead the First Infantry division.  The other tanks followed the lead elements of the American 42nd Infantry division.
Patton was on foot and near his communication wires when he began to lose sight of some of his command.  He left his CP and used runners to communicate with it.  He reported that at least 16 of his tanks were engaged in heavy fighting.  Captain Compton had 25 of his tanks engaged in heavy fighting in his sector, though Patton could not see it from his vantage point.  The fighting was heavy. Captain Dean M Gilifillan commander of the 327th Company A lead one of his platoons through a hail of fire in an attack on the southern edge of Bois de la Sonnard knocking out a number of machine gun nests. The tanks began to bog down due to five days of heavy rain. The tanks were faced to try and cross trenches that were wider than anticipated and bogged down into them due to the heavy mud.
The battled continued through the early afternoon. The tank reserves were needed and fuel was running low and attrition to mud and mechanical failures were high.  The enemy began some withdrawals but continued shell fire. Patton found Brett who had 25 tanks make it two their objective, slightly wounded in the noise but upset to the point of tears. Not for his wound but be cause most of his tanks had run out of gas due to the strain of the mud. They had used far more than anticipated.
Two of Compton’s tanks were able to drag on skids some much needed gas from Bernecourt to Pannes during the night but that was the only fuel to reach the front by 10 am on Friday the September 13th.  Meanwhile the tanks assigned to the 42nd Infantry division had been ordered to move to a rear area by Brigadier General MacArthur as he had obtained the area he was looking to have and he wanted the tanks held in reserved to be called up as needed. They were ordered to a wooded area to be concealed from German air. Patton received a couple of truck loads of gas and oil and ordered it distributed between Compton and Brett’s tank battalions.
Compton was able to refuel enough of his tanks to send another 20 tanks by noon forward to St. Benoit, giving MacArthur a reserve of thirty five tanks.  By 2 pm Brett received an additional supply of fuel and was able to refuel fifty tanks and get them to Vigneulles, where they assembled by midnight.  By the end of the 13th of September and into the morning hors of the 14th, the battle came to a halt and preparations were made to remove the tanks back to and assembly area begin to prepare for the next offensive, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
They were ordered to move to Bois De La Hazelle and prepare for a rail move into the Meuse-Argonne sector. He was to take 15 tanks into the rouge and deploy them near Liverdun on the 19th and 20th of September.
After the offensive the 1st Tank Brigade recovered its tanks, reorganized and reviewed their combat effectiveness. The 1st Tank Brigade was designated in Washington as the 304th Tank Brigade, through still referred to by its rank and file as the 1st Tank Brigade.
To pull this off, Pershing directed some of his soldiers to wear French uniforms and move toward the Moselle River as if they were following up the advance after the Mihiel Offensive. Major Viner, 304th tank school commander, was used to organize and lead a faint of the 326th Battalion, now renamed the 345th under Capt Compton’s command.
The Meuse Argonne offensive was scheduled to begin on September 26, 1918. This was to be the first phase of several phases. Patton received his first briefing on the 15th of September when he meet with Col. Rockenbach in the St. Mihiel sector. He informed Patton that his brigade would retain its present composition and operate in the I corps sector in support of the 35th division.
On the 16th of September, Patton put on a French uniform, so not to give is real reasons for being there and reconnoitered the area in which he would fight. He found the land much better for tanks and divided a plan. Brett’s 344th battalion loaded on trains and moved toward the Clermont and unloaded. Two train loads of Compton’s 345th tank battalion finally arrived after delay at 1 am on September 21st. Upon arrival they were greeted by German artillery shelling while still on the train. Some 56 of his tanks where caught up in the shelling.  The crews unloaded the tanks under heavy fire. One of the flat cars was struck. They drove the tanks right off the rear with out the aid of a ramp.  This was soon emulated and the tanks left the flat cars in a boon jarring move but pulled of without loss of life limb or tank. Truly an amazing feat under fire.
This time Rockenbach ordered far more fuel than he thought needed to keep from repeating the fuel shortages in the St. Mihiel Offensive. Patton went a step further and ordered two twenty liter gasoline can fueled and strapped to the back of the tanks. Though dangerous he felt the risk justified.
Patton had been reprimanded by Rockenbach for not staying back and thus keeping him apprised of the battle, an order that Rockenbach had now issue with threat of court martial for those who willingly left their tank to fight on foot. Patton aware of the orders proceeded to beef up his communication capabilities by increasing the number of runners from 6 to 10 men.  Salvage and repair trucks were brought near to the front so the tanks could be repaired and sent back into battle without having to evacuate them to the rear.
On the eve of the battle, Patton’s tank compliment consisted of 28 French Schnieder tanks, under French command, 69 Renaults in Brett’s command and 58 in the 345th under Compton’s command. They would be joined by the 14 tanks used in the deception earlier.
The Battle Begins
On the morning of the 26th of September 2,700 artillery pieces opened fire, 100,000 doughboys crammed the front lines and a28 mile front opened up. At 530 am in a dense fog, the whistlers were blown and the troops moved forward. Brett’s 344th moved out with lead elements of the 28th division and 35th division. Because of the dense fog, several, of the company commanders lead their tanks on foot searching for places their tanks could cross over the trenches.  Elements of the 344th and the 345th pushed forward in the dense smoke filled fog. Visibility was minimum but this pressed on. The deadly fire of a hail of bullets from the Germans cause the advance to stop and begin to fall back. The tanks and men soon pushed forward again.
The battle in and around the areas assigned to the tank corps was intense.  During the battle, uncommon courage and valor was exhibited by common soldiers. The 1st Tank Brigades was no exception. On September 26, one stood out as being far beyond of the duty expected.  One such soldier was Cpl. Donald M. Call.  He was assigned the 344th Tank battalion and his company became heavily engaged.
During an operation against enemy machinegun nests west of Varennes, Corporal Call was in a tank with an officer when half of the turret was knocked off by a direct artillery hit. Choked by gas from the high-explosive shell, he left the tank and took cover in a shell hole 30 yards away. Seeing that the officer did not follow, and thinking that he might be alive, Corporal Call returned to the tank under intense machinegun and shell fire and carried the officer over a mile under machinegun and sniper fire to safety. For his uncommon bravery he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. This was not the end of the story. The French Government once again recognized his bravery by awarding him the Legion of Honor in the degree of Chevalier and an additional Croix de Guerre with palm. He was also awarded the Montenegrin Order of Prince Danilo I. Two days after the Medal of Honor exploit, from which he emerged unscathed, Call was wounded and spent some time in the hospital. He returned to the front line in time to participate in the Argonne and St. Mihiel offensives. Call was commissioned as a second lieutenant in October, 1918.  During WWI a wound stripe was issued to wear on the shoulder sleeve uniform. Later it was converted to the Purple Heart Award.
Major Brett was put in charge of the Patton’s tank command and Compton was instructed to take charge until Brett could be notified and take command.  Patton’s brigade lost a total of forty three tanks during the first day of operation.
General Rochenbach, concerned over Patton’s loss ordered Brett to stay at the brigade headquarters and Compton to stay in charge at the front. Fighting with the tanks came very closer and some became within ten feat of the enemy. Firing many times at point blank range. German artillery was so close at times that they had to fire open sight and because they were so closed missed most of the time. The 35th division remained disorganized and the tank moved onto other objectives when the infantry could no longer fight along side or support them. One tank was so close to the enemy machine gun, with its cannon out of action, ran headlong through the nest crushing them beneath the tank.
The tanks in the 28th Division sector could count only 11 tanks operation al between the two companies. By the night of the 27th of September the tanks assigned to the faint at St. Mihiel which added fourteen more tanks to the dwindling tank brigade.
Patton had established a moving maintenance plan where the tanks would be removed from the battlefield and taken a distance from the action and pooled together. The salvage and maintenance section would work feverishly along with the men who manned them and quickly got as many back into service as possible.
German reinforcements began to arrive in the First Army sector and some fifty of the tanks that had been in the fighting were knocked out of service
On the morning of the 29th of September the French tank commander, Major Chaioine was ordered to withdraw his mechanically inferior tanks from the I Corps section. The French takers had fought very well but their tanks had reached the limit of their capabilities and could no longer engage the enemy.  This left Brett and Compton with only fifty five operational tanks. They would have had many less but the tanks were being repaired and returned to service as far as the tank maintenance and recovery section could do so.
Infantry units along the front had been fighting for three days and began to collapse for exhaustion and lack of food. The 1st tank brigade was withdrawn to a reserve position near Montblainville in the 28th division sector. The 35th Infantry division was finally relieved and had suffered between 6000 to 8000 casualties.
The fighting became sporadic and on the 30th of September the 30th and 28th infantry asked for tank assistance and two tank platoons were engaged. On the 1st of October the Germans counter-attacked Five tanks were destroyed by artillery fire killing several and wounding many others.
On the eve of the renewal of the offensive of 4th October Rockenbach wrote a report. He stated that  that included both the dead and wounded, the 1st Tank Brigade had suffered casualties of 53 percent of its officers and 65 enlisted men which was near 25%. His estimate was that he could start with only 72 light tanks and based on attrition that at the current rate the battalion would be finished by the 5th or 6th of October.  His estimate was not far off. The Meuse Argonne offensive continued and the both the men and the tanks were pushed to the limit.
The men of the 1st Tank Brigade were far more resilient that the report and they were resolved to continue the fight.
On the second phase of operations in the Meuse –Argonne and the 1 tank brigade and been busy and resurrected some of the down tanks and could now field 89 tanks.  The fighting was intense, many times the tanks got out of their tanks and assaulted positions on foot when their tank could not achieve the objective or was broken down. By the 5h of October the tanks numbers were now down to 30 operational.  By the 6th of October, continuous service over the last month and taken its toll and only 17 were left.  These tanks were ordered in reserve while pressure was put on in an effort to relieve pressure on the 77th division. The “”Lost Battalion in the Argonne Forest.
On October 6th, Corporal Harold W. Roberts, Company A of the 344th Tank Battalion, 1st Tank Brigade was moving his tank toward the tank maintenance center collection point near Bois de Montrebeau. Enemy fire was prevalent and trying to avoid being hit he inadvertently drove his tank into a water tank trap.